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In Response To: Jesse Bohl's What are we to do about traditional logic? 
(c)2000 Gilbert Plumer 
For certain purposes, using traditional Aristotelian logic would be like using
Roman numerals to do math: Why employ an ancient, unwieldy system when a
system is available that is more elegant and easier to use? For example,
consider how Aristotelian logic treats singular statements. ‘Socrates is a man’
becomes the universal affirmative ‘everything identical with Socrates is a man’
(extensional reading), or ‘Socratesness is wholly included in manness’ (Bohl’s
"intensional" reading—cf. 3, 5, 8, n6, n14). Compare this to the natural use of
predicate terms and individual constants to form singular statements (Ms) in
what Professor Bohl usually takes to be "modern logic," i.e., "first order
predicate logic" (1).2 Or consider the contortions one must engage in to treat
arguments with more than three terms syllogistically; one must creatively
translate allegedly ‘disguised’ categorical statements, construct sorties or
chains of syllogisms, and so forth. If Aristotle were alive today, it is hard to
believe that even he would use Aristotelian logic in such cases.
In many other kinds of cases the use of Aristotelian logic is simply not an
option, assuming that a true logic is desired, which requires a formal system
with a rigorous semantics. Bohl says that a reason "one might prefer modern
to traditional logic" is that "Aristotelian logic is a weaker formal system than
modern logic, because modern logic validates more inferences than does
traditional logic" (2). But he rejects this view, ultimately saying that he does not
see it "as giving us a reason to choose one logic over the other" (8). He seems
to imply that as far as the number and kind of inferences validated goes, it is a
toss up between Aristotelian and first-order predicate logic (2, 4, 6). But surely
this is false. Consider the distinctive inferences of propositional logic such as
Simplification that first-order predicate logic incorporates, or the fact that there
is no logic of relations in Aristotelian logic. In Aristotelian logic there is no
capability of validating inferences involving numerical adjectives such as ‘there
are exactly three F’s, so there are at least two F’s’. Moreover, first-order
predicate logic has shown itself to be remarkably adaptable and extendable—
from Russell’s Theory of Descriptions and Davidson’s proposal about
adverbial modification (involving quantification over events) to an extension
such as quantified modal logic. As compared to this inherent flexibility and
power to provide a unified formal account, Aristotelian logic is, let’s face it,
pathetic with its catalog of ‘immediate inferences’ between categorical
statements and its twenty-four valid syllogistic patterns.
Much of the rub for Professor Bohl appears to revolve around his claim that, in
contrast to first-order predicate logic, "Aristotelian logic allows some universal
statements about the allegedly non-existent to be false, some particular
statements to be true" (3-4; cf. 1, 7). At first glance, the claim about "modern"
logic here may seem correct: such universal statements would all be held to be
true in that they are understood to be truth-functional conditionals with
unsatisfiable antecedents (because the objects don’t exist), and all such
particular statements are false because they make existence claims. However,
this is more accurately regarded as belonging to the standard philosophy of
"modern" logic, and not to first-order predicate logic itself. For example, there
is nothing in the logic that prevents the domain from consisting of fictional
objects and the existential quantifier from meaning there exists in fiction. Bohl
himself seems to acknowledge that this is really a philosophical matter in
saying that "Anglo-American philosophy’s robust sense of reality has lead [sic]
it to understand existence as continuous, if brief and small, spatial and/or
temporal location," and that a more generous, Heideggerean conception
would allow a "mode of being" for fictional and mythological objects (7).
Moreover, even while maintaining an exclusive spatio-temporal notion of
existence, universal and particular statements about fictional objects could be
interpreted as statements about other claims—e.g., understanding ‘some
Greek gods are humanly formed’ as (roughly) ‘Greek mythology claims that
some gods are humanly formed’ (cf. Copi 1978: 187). Nothing in first-order
predicate logic prevents this statement from being held to be true. Hence I find
this criticism puzzling.
Even more puzzling is what Professor Bohl says about Aristotelian logic on this
question. It is common to take Aristotle as having "assumed application for all
the general terms with which he dealt" (Kneale & Kneale 1962: 60);
"categorical propositions may be said to presuppose that the classes to which
they refer do have members" (Copi 1978: 187). A Grician way of making the
point is to say that existence is "conversationally implied" (e.g., Fogelin 1982:
198ff.). Some such interpretation is necessary, for otherwise logical relations in
the traditional ‘square of opposition’ fail. For example, without a
presupposition of existence, the relation of subalternation between A and I, and
E and O, propositions would fail. And it must be something like presupposition
and not overt existential import. For if (e.g.) ‘all A is B’ also said ‘there are A’,
then ‘some A is not B’ would not be the contradictory; rather ‘either some A is
not B or there are no A’ would be the contradictory. So why wouldn’t
Aristotelian logic simply fail to apply to statements like "All unicorns are white"
(Bohl’s example on 1)? In a somewhat similar way, first-order predicate logic
cannot handle fictional or mythological names (e.g., Existential Generalization
applies to them), although the slight modifications of free logic allow it to do so
(e.g., Sainsbury 1991: ch. 4, sec. 20).
As far as I can determine, Bohl gives two sorts of reasons for holding that
Aristotelian logic allows some universal statements about fictional entities to
be false and some particular statements to be true. The first reason is a kind of
argument from authority. Aristotle draws a distinction between substantial and
nonsubstantial predication—the former attributes essential, and the latter
contingent or accidental, properties. After reviewing a few scattered but
seemingly relevant remarks of Aristotle, Bohl says "[o]ne might then go on to
say that propositions about essential properties are true or false regardless of
the actual existence, now or ever, of their subjects, while propositions about
accidental properties are either true or false or neither" (3). This is apparently
supposed to allow (e.g.) "No centaurs are half human and half horse" to be
false and "Some gods are female" to be true (3) since these propositions
concern essential properties. But this seems to be a really bad argument:
Because Aristotle says certain things that are possibly compatible with a
certain view, that view is incorporated into Aristotelian logic, and is an
advantage of it over first-order predicate logic. No systematic development or
rigorous semantics is presented along these lines. For instance, why are some
propositions that ascribe accidental properties neither true nor false? All we
get from Bohl is the remark that Aristotle held that this applies to propositions
about objects that do not yet exist, and that "one might then generalize" this to
"the fictional, mythological etc." (n7). Do fictional or mythological objects have
any accidental properties in the first place? It is not easy to see how a pure
mental construct could have anything but essential properties. So what is the
status of Bohl’s example, "All unicorns are white," given that Aristotle himself
held that whiteness is an accidental property, at least for "men" (Aristotle: i.5)?
The other reason that Bohl appears to give is "[f]or Aristotle, there are four
irreducible intra-sentential relations: complete inclusion (A-form), complete
exclusion (E-form), at least partial inclusion (I-form) and at least partial
exclusion (O-form)" (5), where this is supposed to be understood intensionally,
e.g., "Unicornness is wholly included in whiteness" (8), because this reading
"of course. . .allows the problematic inferences to go through" (n14). Perhaps
there is something to this incipient semantics—if unicornness is wholly
included in whiteness, then surely it is at least partially included (etc.), and
maybe whether there are any unicorns or not would have no logical effect.
However, understood intensionally, the referents here are either concepts or
properties, and in either case the relationships seem backwards. Surely we
would want to say that the concept of being white is a component of that of
being a unicorn, and not the other way around; otherwise, being white would
entail being a unicorn (and I should think that I am one but not the other). The
complex property of being a unicorn (a one-horned, white horse) includes that
of whiteness; the simple property of whiteness does not include unicornness. In
addition, understood intensionally, it is entirely unclear what partial inclusion or
exclusion would amount to. Incidentally, if we are forced to extensional
readings, then much of Bohl’s alleged contrast between Aristotelian and
modern logic (or more exactly, their attendant philosophies) on the matter of
appealing to sets becomes otiose.
Whatever the path, Professor Bohl seems to arrive at the right conclusions:
The aim of logic is not so much to capture "’the’ logic of natural language" (10)
as it is to construct ideal languages for "both comparison with and contrast to
natural language" (9). The principal normative force of logic is a kind of
hypothetical imperative of consistency: "If you accept certain inferences, you
ought to accept these other inferences as valid." A logical representation is
"useful" to the extent that it "replicates in a clearer and/or more systematic way
what we already do" in natural language (9). Along these lines, Bohl only
alludes to (5-6) what is probably the starkest contrast between how Aristotelian
and first-order predicate logic represent natural language: unlike the former
with its categorical representations, the latter takes ordinary language
universal and existential quantifications that are not in conditional or
conjunctive form as if they were in these forms. Insofar as any such departure in
our formalizations is prima facie questionable, in particular cases the use of
Aristotelian logic may be preferable, so long as it adequately expresses
purported validity in the case at hand. Casting these matters as partly decided
by student intuitions seems misguided—those intuitions are too easy to
manipulate.
Endnotes 
1I am grateful to Kenneth Olson for help with this reply. (Title endnote still to be
added)
2Bohl says "since grammatically proper names are not logically proper names,
they are reasonable read as predicates" (n6). Not only would this not follow, but
grammatically proper names, as successfully used, function like individual
constants in a semantical interpretation in first-order predicate logic—each
has a single referent. 
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